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Abstract: Adoption of security standards has the capability of improving the secu-
rity level in an organization as well as to provide additional beneﬁts and possibilities
to the organization. However mapping of used standards has to be done when more
than one security standard is employed in order to prevent redundant activities, not
optimal resource management and unnecessary outlays. Employment of security on-
tology to map diﬀerent standards can reduce the mapping complexity however the
choice of security ontology is of high importance and there are no analyses on security
ontology suitability for adaptive standards mapping.
In this paper we analyze existing security ontologies by comparing their general prop-
erties, OntoMetric factors and ability to cover diﬀerent security standards. As none
of the analysed security ontologies were able to cover more than 1/3 of security stan-
dards, we proposed a new security ontology, which increased coverage of security
standards compared to the existing ontologies and has a better branching and depth
properties for ontology visualization purposes. During this research we mapped 4
security standards (ISO 27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTIR 7621) to the new
security ontology, therefore this ontology and mapping data can be used for adaptive
mapping of any set of these security standards to optimize usage of multiple security
standards in an organization.
Keywords: security ontology, security standards, adaptive mapping.
1 Introduction
An ontology deﬁnes the basic terms and relations compromising the vocabulary of a topic area
as well as the rules for combining terms and relations to deﬁne extensions to the vocabulary [9].
The ontology provides a better communication, reusability and organization of knowledge by
decreasing language ambiguity and structuring transferred data [1], [2], [3], [4].
Security becomes fundamental in our society and the survival of organizations depends on
the correct management of up-to-date security elements [6]. As the security area is very broad
and has many relations between its concepts, usage of security ontology could improve security
knowledge description unambiguity in information systems. The necessity of security ontology
can be noticed in various security communities and considered as an important challenge and a
research branch [5], [7], [8].
In small and medium enterprises the knowledge database of security area and its unambiguity
is very important in formal/legal activities, such as certiﬁcation, standard compliance, etc. In
many cases organizations have to meet certain security requirements from diﬀerent sources, which
may be redundant or overlapping by simultaneous usage. Therefore standard mapping should be
put into practice in cases where more than one security standard has to be met. The mapping
of security standards allows the optimization of resources by indicating matching elements of
standards and by eliminating duplicated activities and security measures to meet it. However
mapping of security standards can be complicated if more than two standards have to be mapped.
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Security ontology can be used to simplify the mapping of more than two security standards
[10]. This solution suggests mapping all security standards under one security ontology. This
ontology would act as a basis for standard knowledge formalization and would allow adaptive
mapping of any standards, mapped to the ontology. Therefore the security ontology plays a
large role in adaptive mapping and covers a wide area and should be detailed to meet all security
standards.
The aim of this paper is to analyse suitability of existing security ontologies to be used for
adaptive mapping of security standards and to propose a new one, more suitable for the purpose.
2 Security Ontology
Existing security ontologies vary according to described area and level of detail. One of the
ﬁrst works mentioning information system knowledge concepts concerning security was published
in 1990 by J. Mylopoulos et al. The paper "Telos: Representing Knowledge about Information
Systems" [12] describes a Telos language to describe the knowledge about information systems
and suggests it can be employed for security speciﬁcation as well. C. E. Landwehr et al. on 1994
published a paper called "A taxonomy of computer program security ﬂaws " [13] where types of
computer program security ﬂaws were summarized and claimed it can be used for introduction
to the characteristics of security ﬂaws and their origins. A. Avizienis et al. also proposed a
taxonomy, concerning security concepts [14]. This taxonomy describes more abstract and wide
concepts than C. E. Landwehr et al. provided however clear relationships between categories of
taxonomy are missing too.
The need of ontology rather than taxonomy was indicated in a paper "Toward a Security
Ontology" by M. Donner on 2003 [7]. On the same year G. Denker et. al. presented security
related ontologies for web services and published it in paper "Security in the Semantic Web using
OWL" [15] while H. Mouratidis el al. published work "An Ontology for Modelling Security: The
Tropos Approach" [16] where presented ontology for security modelling in agent-based informa-
tion systems. H. Mouratidis provided more works concerning security ontologies [17], [5] where
clear orientation to usage of security ontologies in software developments is noticed, therefore
these ontologies are meant more for system requirement representation rather than for basic
security concepts.
There are ontologies concentrated speciﬁcally on security requirements only. One of such
ontologies is presented by F. Massacci [18]. Other speciﬁc security ontologies are proposed by D.
Geneiatakis et al. [19] (designed for describing Session Initiation Protocol security ﬂaws), by M.
Karyda et al. [20] (dedicated for describing applications of e-government), by J. Undercoﬀer et
al. [21] (designed for describing computer attacks), by A. Souag [22] (designed for requirements
engineering process) and by other authors. A. Kim extended speciﬁc ontologies and created one
which can be applied to any electronic resource [23]. However this ontology does not overlay all
the concepts of information security. More detailed general security ontologies were proposed by
A. Herzog et al. [24] and S. Fenz et al. [25].
Security ontology, proposed by Herzog et al. represents information security domain that
includes both general concepts and speciﬁc vocabulary of the domain. The proposed ontology
has 4 top level concepts: assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. The ontology
overviews the information security domain in a context-independent and application neutral
manner. Similar properties apply to security ontology proposed by S. Fenz et al. however it has
more concepts in it including non-core concepts such as the infrastructure of organizations. The
main top level concepts in this ontology are: asset, control, organization, threat and vulnerability.
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Table 1: Data of general comparison of security ontologies
Ontology
Property G. Denker A. Herzog S. Fenz S. Fenz (raw)
Total number of classes 39 460 641 311
Total number of data types properties 0 7 16 14
Total number of object properties 12 30 58 58
Total number of annotation properties 2 4 10 10
Total number of individuals 117 211 486 478
Number of sub-classes 11 571 1051 409
Max. depth of class tree 4 8 6 6
Min. depth of class tree 1 1 1 1
Avg. depth of class tree 1,4 4,1 3,0 3,2
Max. branching factor of class tree 27 83 199 114
Min. branching factor of class tree 1 1 1 1
Avg. branching factor of class tree 7,6 3,2 3,9 14,5
3 Analysis of Security Ontologies
Three security ontologies were chosen for deeper analysis because of its particularity: security
ontology created by G. Denker; Security ontology, created by A. Herzog et al.; Security ontology,
created by S. Fenz.
While S. Fenz security ontology includes concepts of several security standards (ISO 27001,
Grundschutz) in it, one more version of S. Fenz’s security ontology will be analyzed in this study
(hereinafter S. Fenz (raw)). All classes and elements of security standards will be excluded from
S. Fenz’s ontology, relying solely on raw concepts of ontology security.
3.1 General Comparison
In general comparison of security ontologies the total number of diﬀerent ontology elements,
the depth and branching metric of the ontology tree are put into comparison. To get these
metrics an OWL ontology editor SWOOP was used. Data obtained by this tool are presented in
Table 1.
As results of general ontology comparison reveal, G. Denker’s ontologies have the least number
of concepts, while security ontologies, created by S. Fenz and A. Herzog have the largest number
of concepts. G. Denker’s ontology is intended to interface between various notations of security
standards while ontologies of S. Fenz and A. Herzog represent the whole area of security, therefore
have more concepts.
The purpose of ontology usage inﬂicts on the number of individuals as well - wider range
ontologies have more individuals to allow user to chose from; speciﬁc purpose ontologies have
less or no individuals as all individuals should be known or unnecessary to the user.
Another important metric is the depth and branching factor of ontology class tree. It deﬁnes
the main properties of tree structure of the ontology and can be exercised to deﬁne how intuitive
the ontology should be for individual users. Our analysis displays the security ontology of A.
Herzog has the deepest class structure and has the most substantial detailing level. However the
maximum branching factor of class tree is equal to 83, which may result in human users facing
diﬃculties while viewing the ontology. Ontology of S. Fenz should be diﬃcult to visualize as
well, because of its branching factor.
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Table 2: OntoMetric analysis data of the ontologies content and the contents organization
Ontology
Characteristic G. Denker A. Herzog S. Fenz S. Fenz (raw)
Concepts (factor) 2 4 4 4
Relations (factor) 3 3 3 3
Taxonomy (factor) 2 3 3 3
Axioms (factor) 2 4 4 4
3.2 OntoMetric Analysis of Security Ontologies
General comparison of security ontologies gives just a few main quantitative metrics, while
the quality of ontology is not taken into account. OntoMetric [26] is a method for ontology quality
measurement. This method compares ontologies in ﬁve dimensions (the ontologies content and
the contents organization; the language in which it is implemented; the methodology that has
been followed to develop it; the software tools used to build and edit the ontology; the costs that
the ontology will require in a certain project) and measures all the characteristics from 1 to 5
according to their low or high degree of accomplishment.
While all ontologies we are analyzing are written in the same ﬁle format, we are analyzing the
content metrics alone (metric of language, tools and costs should be equal, because all analyzed
ontologies are written in OWL ﬁles, while the development process of ontology do not have
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on its usage and are unknown to us). According to OntoMetric, the content
of ontology can be deﬁned by 4 factors: concepts, relations, taxonomy and axioms.
As evaluation of OntoMetric is qualitative, we will evaluate all of them as all security ontolo-
gies are meant for presenting the broadest security area possible and should be able to present
any situation in area of information security. The imagination of ideal security ontology is impor-
tant in order to evaluate the concept factor in OntoMetric analysis as this measurement should
provide information on how well the security area is covered by the ontology.
Other factors in OntoMetric analysis are more relative and describes how well the relations,
taxonomy and axioms are described in the ontology, not the whole security area.
All data of our OntoMetrix analysis are presented in Table 2.
The OntoMetrix analysis shows the G. Danker ontology has the lowest scores, while S. Fenz
and A. Herzog ontologies have similar scores, the level of detail and provides wide range of
security concepts. However the data of OntoMetric analysis does not show diﬀerences between
S. Fenz and A. Herzog.
While comparing the diﬀerences in S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontologies, it can be noticed
that ontology, created by A. Herzog has more of a theoretical approach rather than the ontology
of S. Fenz and describes more deﬁnitions, formal concepts of information security area. S. Fenz’s
ontology provides more information on practical side of information security, by listing basic
controls as a guide for security administrators for system security assurance however does not
mention concepts, related to organizational security.
3.3 Research of Security Ontology Usage for Mapping of Security Standards
As security ontologies, proposed by A. Herzog and S. Fenz have similar ontology comparison
results, a deeper analysis has to be performed to select the best one for usage in adaptive mapping
of security standards.
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Adaptive Mapping of Security Standards
To ensure security in an organization, security standards or best practices can be employed.
In some cases compliance to a certain security standard is even required to obtain privileges
to supply or to get diﬀerent services. However when organization uses more than one security
standard, mapping or integration of security standard usage should be done in order to avoid
redundant activities, not optimal resource management, unnecessary outlays etc. Integration or
direct mapping of security standards are time and knowledge consuming as well as very static
(everything has to be redone when a standard has to be removed or added), while adaptive
mapping of security standards provides more ﬂexibility to change the list of used standards as
well as requires less work to map a larger number of standards as each standard have to be
mapped to ontology only. Therefore n mapping activities have to be done to map n standards in
stead of n*(n-1) mappings for direct mapping. The process of adaptive mapping and integrated
standard generation is presented in Fig. 1
Figure 1: Sequence of mapping two standards and generating the mapped standard in relation
to the structure of ontology
When a standard is mapped to the base ontology, all matching controls and concepts between
ontology and standards have to be linked. This has to be done once for all standards which have
to be mapped together. The generation of standard maps or integrated standards is dynamic
and can be done on demand by changing standards which have to be mapped or integrated,
properties for relation type estimation etc. The map generation process ﬁnds similar controls in
selected standards by comparing its linking to the base ontology. An example of relation type
estimation in adaptive mapping is provided in Fig. 2.
In this example a control in ISO 27001 (A.8.3.3_Removal_of_access_righ...) and control in
PCI DSS (PCI_DSS_8_5_4) standards are mapped with the same links to the security ontology
(control in one standard has the same relations to concepts of security standard as control in
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Figure 2: Example of standard mapping trough ontology
another standard). As these two controls have no diﬀerences in mapping, the full match relation
between these two controls of diﬀerent standards can be generated. One more control of ISO
27001 standard (A.11.2.1_User_registration) is presented in this example to illustrate relevant
(not matching) controls. These two controls of ISO 27001 security standard deﬁne situations,
where vulnerability of nonblocked unnecessary accounts or terminals can be exploited. However
both of ISO 27001 controls have more links to diﬀerent concepts of security ontology, therefore
these two ISO 27001 controls can not be treated as equal, however are relevant on certain levels.
This kind of information can be used to analyse security standards and to optimize the resource
usage when multiple security standards have to be met in an organization.
For visualization and analysis of overlapping of multiple security standards a tool for adaptive
mapping of security standards was created (see Fig. 3). This tool uses security ontology and maps
security standards data to generated tree structure hierarchies, representing a chosen security
standard or integration of few security standards as well as providing additional data trough
node notation and explanation boxes on similarities of controls in chosen security standards.
Research of Security Standards Coverage by Security Ontologies
To compare which security ontology is more suitable for adaptive security standards mapping
and adaptive mapping, ontology and standard concept coverage were analyzed. A. Herzog’s and
S. Fenz’s ontologies were mapped with:
• ISO27001 - the most popular security standard, which was created according to British
Security standard BS7799. This standard covers practically all security areas, provides
certiﬁcation opportunity and is widely recognized.
• PCI DSS - security standard developed by such worldwide organizations as Visa, Mas-
terCard, American Express, Discover and JCB. Standard developed to ensure cardholder
information protection. This standard is a "Must-have" for all organizations who handle
debit, credit, prepaid and other cards. Otherwise these organizations are forbidden to use
Visa, MasterCard, American Express and other cards.
• ISSA 5173 - security standard for SME (Small Medium Enterprise). This standard has
not been approved or oﬃcially recognized, however describes main security requirements,
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which need to be implemented in any organization.
• NISTIR 7621 - security standard, developed by national institute of Standards and tech-
nology. Document clearly deﬁnes which actions are "absolutely necessary" for information,
systems and networks protection. It also provides best practices on needed security level
implementation.
Data on links between these security standards are presented in static form for 2 speciﬁc
standards (as a table with matching controls between two security standards [28]) mostly. S.
Fenz was the ﬁrst who mapped ISO 27001 and Grundschutz security standards to his ontology.
He used this mapping for purposes of automated risk and utility management [11], however this
information can be also used for adaptive standard mapping. S. Fenz mapped two standards
only, therefore links can only be generated between ISO 27001 and Grundschutz security.
We analyzed all controls in all 4 chosen standards and mapped them to related concepts in
S. Fenz and A. Herzog security ontologies. The mapping of security standards was performed
by mapping the lowest level concepts (usually it’s a certain control, requirement for the organi-
zation), while the classes in security standards, used for presentation of class hierarchy were not
accounted as mapping objects.
The process of security standard mapping to security ontologies revealed diﬀerences between
analyzed ontologies as well. Biggest part of mapping links in S. Fenz’s ontology are very direct
- one requirement of the standard has an equal or very similar control in S. Fenz’s ontology.
This type of mapping links are very direct, easy to understand for individual users, however the
controls have to be detailed by other links between diﬀerent concepts of the ontology, otherwise
it will be diﬃcult to deﬁne relations between standards controls, clustering, etc. Meanwhile
mapping security standards according to A. Herzog’s ontology was done from logical structure
standpoint - one requirement of security standard is to have several links to ontology, by describ-
ing which concepts of ontology are related to this requirement (by deﬁning what and how one has
to do or use to protect against certain threat or vulnerability). This type of mapping requires
more mapping links and has a potential to be easier to cluster controls of security standards into
relevant groups. This type of mapping would be more understandable to information systems
however would require more analysis or visualizing tools for people to understand links between
two security standards, mapped through ontology this way.
Summarizing the security standard mapping process to security ontologies - S. Fenz’s ontology
can be used to simplify the mapping of security standards because all the most important concepts
for mapping are described as list of classes, while in ontology of A. Herzog’s mapped classes have
more links to ontology and provide more analysis and application possibilities after the mapping
is done.
In table 3 data on ontology coverage by standard (covered) and standard coverage by ontology
(covers) are provided. Column "covered" deﬁnes what part of security ontology was used to map
certain standard while column "covers" deﬁnes what percentage of security standard was mapped
to the security ontology. The property "covers" is more important in this research as it provides
information on how well the ontology is capable to present certain security standards in the
knowledge database.
The analysis of security ontology and standard coverage revealed that ontologies of A. Herzog
and S. Fenz are not capable to fully cover none of analyzed security standards: only security
standards with small number of controls or requirements can be mapped with security ontology
to cover more than 50% of standard controls; security standards with more than 100 controls
or requirements can not be mapped to A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s security ontologies to cover
more then 30% of standard controls or requirements. This shows the fact that these two security
ontologies do not have all necessary concepts to be fully mapped to security standards.
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Analysis of concepts of security ontologies to be employed to map security standard revealed
that just a small part (5-18%) of classes from A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies are mapped
directly to security standards. This number could be improved by providing more detailed
concept of relationship, however it allows deﬁning what part of ontology is directly related to
concepts, mentioned in security standards.
Security ontology, created by S. Fenz was able to cover a larger part of analyzed security
standards than A. Harz’s ontology. The biggest diﬀerence (29% and 19%) was noticed in PCI
DSS standard. This could be an argument to chose S. Fenz’s security ontology if a company
is working with PSI DSS standards, while coverage diﬀerences for other analyzed standards
are minor. However to cover 29% of PSI DSS standard is not enough to represent it. A new
security ontology with more security concepts could help to improve the situation and would
allow mapping of bigger parts of security standards.
4 New Security Ontology
As S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontologies have low security standard coverage and are not
the excellent choice for adaptive mapping of security standards we have created a new general
purpose security ontology, which would extend these two ontologies and would be more suitable
for adaptive mapping of security standards.
Our ontology has 5 top level classes (see. Fig. 3): asset, countermeasure, organization, threat
and vulnerability. These 5 classes are the most basic in security area and are detailed in lower
levels.
Figure 3: Top level structure of proposed Security ontology
Asset class describes both tangible and intangible asset an organization can have. We de-
scribe this class more appropriately than other security ontologies do with the addition of more
knowledge on used data by the organization, location and other equipment, owned or used in
the company and related to organization’s security. The intangible asset is divided into Data
and Software (see Fig. 4), while inner structure describes various types of data and software.
The tangible assets are structured to subclasses of Movable and Unmovable asset (see Fig. 4).
Immovable asset describes location and building concepts and main elements which can be found
in it. We structured movable assets into 4 subclasses: alarm systems and detectors; furniture; IT
components; utilities. These 4 categories allows the creation of more links to security standards
by deﬁning what kind of assets are involved into certain controls (who is at risk, who has a
vulnerability etc.).
Countermeasure and Threat classes are described pretty well in A. Herzog’s ontology, there-
fore we made minor changes to it and use similar structure and components as A. Herzog did.
The need for more organizational concepts arose during the mapping of security standards
to A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s security ontologies. These two ontologies have a poor description
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Figure 4: Basic hierarchy of asset concept
of organization structure and policies, while the companies’ information security policy is the
most important to ensure its security. As subclasses of organization Department, Personnel and
Policy concepts were distinguished (see Fig. 5). Precise control description of security standards
can be achieved if links to certain executor can be made. Therefore Department and Personnel
classes were added and detailed to distinguish plausible types of departments and positions in it.
COBIT is a framework [27], which describes the best ideas for information technology man-
agement, quality, evaluation and improvement. Therefore we adopted COBIT 5 framework into
our ontology, by deﬁning IT policy class as organization policy subclass, where all COBIT 5
ideas are detailed (see Fig. 5). The COBIT 5 framework was exercised as it is in IT policies
class. This guaranties the intuit of ontology usage to those, who is familiar with COBIT frame-
work. Meanwhile in order to propose multiple views and ways to ﬁnd necessary concepts in the
ontology, more subclasses were added to Policy class (see Fig. 5). These classes should present
more general policies of the organization however most of them have relations to classes of IT
policies class (COBIT 5 framework).
Figure 5: Basic hierarchy of organization concept
Vulnerability class was not detailed properly in A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies as well. S.
Fenz provides a list of vulnerabilities describing individuals with no structure, while A. Herzog
describes simply basic types of vulnerabilities. Therefore we extended vulnerability class by
dividing it into Code vulnerabilities, Conﬁguration vulnerabilities, Design vulnerabilities, Policy
vulnerabilities and Transfer vulnerabilities (see Fig. 6). Those classes are detailed to reﬂect the
basic security vulnerabilities, however they are more structured than in S. Fenz’s ontology, to
make it more intuitive and simpler to visualize.
To use this ontology as a base for adaptive mapping of security standards a clear and intuitive
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Figure 6: Basic hierarchy of vulnerability concept
ontology structure has to be maintained. We optimized the tree structure of the ontology,
therefore now it has 1795 classes, average depth of class tree is 6,5 (has maximum up to 9 depth
of class tree) and average branching factor of class tree is 4,8 (has from 1 to 18 subclasses). Such
a structure is more viewable in tree structure and should be more intuitive for ontology users
(see Fig. 7).
Figure 7: Structure fragment of proposed security ontology and adaptive mapping data in AMSS
(created tool for adaptive mapping of security standard)
While structure optimization of new security ontology is more important to ensure user
friendly usage and understanding, new concepts allowed a better coverage of security standards.
We do not provide direct list of controls and use similar ontology structure for standard mapping
as A. Herzog therefore security standard mapping to this ontology has to be done by deﬁning
more than one relation to ontology. This mapping property is useful to analyze and to map
security concepts in diﬀerent standards.
ISO27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTIR 7621 security standards were speciﬁed and
mapped to it in order to evaluate its suitability to map security standards. Using this ontology
as a base for adaptive mapping, 80% of ISO27001, 100% of PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTIR
7621 standards were mapped to the ontology (see Table 3).
The 100% mapping of ISO27001 standard was not achieved because we did not mapped very
speciﬁc requirements in security standard (like security properties of used operating system etc.)
to more abstract in our ontology.
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Table 3: Coverage of ontology to standard and standard to ontology
Ontology/Standard coverage
Standard S. Fenz A. Herzog Proposed ontology
Covered Covers Covered Covers Covered Covers
ISO27001
35/311
(11%)
23/133
(17%)
26/460
(6%)
19/133
(14%)
130/1795
(7%)
107/133
(80%)
PCI DSS
42/311
(14%)
48/165
(29%)
25/460
(5%)
32/165
(19%)
132/1795
(7%)
165/165
(100%)
ISSA 5173
31/311
(10%)
7/12
(58%)
29/460
(6%)
6/12
(50%)
15/1795
(1%)
12/12
(100%)
NISTIR 7621
14/311
(5%)
8/10
(80%)
21/460
(5%)
8/10
(80%)
19/1795
(1%)
10/10
(100%)
This ontology and mapping of these 4 security standards to it can be used to generate
adaptive maps between any of the two mapped security standards or integrated standard can
be created with the usage of any set of mapped security standards without the necessity to map
two security standards directly. As our proposed security ontology can cover a larger part of
concepts in analysed security standards (the average coverage of these 4 security standards is
92%, while S. Fenz’s average coverage of these security standards is 27%, A. Herzog - 20%) the
adaptive mapping of security standards will be more precise by applying it as a base ontology.
However the ontology does not cover all standards by 100%, therefore should be improved to get
even bigger precision of adaptive mapping.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
General comparison of G. Denker’s, A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s security ontologies has shown
the necessity of user friendly ontology structure - all three ontologies have classes, with more
than 25 subclasses in them. Such ontology could be diﬃcult to use for visual presentation or
quick knowledge search.
OntoMetric methodology allows a more precise judgment on security ontologies rather than
general comparison, because it enables an evaluation of the content of compared ontologies.
However the evaluation marks are very dependable on the evaluator’s opinion and requirements
for the ontology. Evaluation of ontologies’ ability to be mapped to security standards is a more
suitable measurement to choose the base ontology for adaptive mapping of security standards
comparing to OntoMetric.
In order to evaluate ontologies’ suitability to map diﬀerent security standards we compared
percentage of concepts in security standard (ISO 27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTR 7621)
which can be mapped to security ontology. This research revealed there are no security ontologies,
that would be able to map at least 50% of any security standards we have analyzed. This fact
implies the necessity of new or modiﬁed ontology, which could be used to present larger parts of
knowledge, used in security standards.
We proposed a new security ontology, by integrating concepts of COBIT framework, part
of classes of A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies. This new ontology increased the coverage of
security standards. Using this security ontology, from 80% to 100% of analyzed security standards
(ISO 27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTR 7621) can be mapped to it. This percentage can
be increased even more with the addition of more speciﬁc (related to payment cards, law and
standard requirements etc.) concepts to this ontology. The proposed security ontology has a
more balanced tree structure as well, which increases its visualization possibilities.
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